Iran: No Country for Minorities

June 1, 2020

The Iranian regime privileges Shi’a Muslims and Persian speakers. Consequently, the conceptualization of the “Iranian people” exported abroad is one that gives visibility to Tehran and other urban areas of the Persian “center,” sidelining those who live on the periphery. Any perceived threat to the center thus becomes the justification for state violence. The 1% of the population belonging to recognized non-Muslim religious minorities are second-class citizens, and non-recognized religious minorities are afforded no constitutional rights. The 10% of the Iranian population that is Sunni Muslim rather than Shi’a is largely non-Persian. The intersectional suppression of ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs, in addition to non-Shi’a and non-Muslim religious minorities, points to glaring gaps in international solidarity.

In March of 2020, when the Iranian government responded to hunger strikes and prison rebellions by selectively releasing prisoners during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, prisoners in Tehran were prioritized, and therefore ethnic minorities were far less likely to see freedom. No prisoner with “national security threat” listed on their charge sheet was eligible for release, a restriction which severely narrows the number of prisoners in Iran from lenient treatment and effectively bars ethnic minorities from release.

Below is an article published by Open Democracy
Picture by Iranian Presidency/dpa/PA Images via Open Democracy.

The visibility of Iran’s geopolitical rivalry with the United States through the Trump administration’s continuation of economic warfare against the Islamic Republic, has upheld Iran’s state-propagated narrative that the US is the oppressor and the regime is the oppressed. The brutality of economic sanctions and the destruction this policy incurs upon the Iranian people cannot be denied. The effects are compounded as the regime consolidates economic resources for the elite. However, the narrative in which the regime embodies the oppressed group erases the reality of those oppressed just as much by Iranian state structures, if not more, than external sanctions. By structural design, the Iranian state privileges Shi’a Muslims and Persian speakers. Consequently, the conceptualization of the “Iranian people” exported abroad is one that gives visibility to Tehran and other urban areas of the Persian “center,” sidelining those who live on the periphery. Any perceived threat to the center thus becomes the justification for state violence.

In order to build a solidarity movement with the Iranian people, one must look beyond the Iranian government to define the population’s struggles. The majority of Iranians (~60%) are Persian, yet the most extreme forms of state violence are inflicted upon minorities who are disproportionately represented in Iran’s prison system and comprise the majority of those sentenced to death or killed extrajudicially. The 1% of the population belonging to recognized non-Muslim religious minorities are second-class citizens, and non-recognized religious minorities are afforded no constitutional rights. The 10% of the Iranian population that is Sunni Muslim rather than Shi’a is largely non-Persian. The intersectional suppression of ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluchis, and Arabs, in addition to non-Shi’a and non-Muslim religious minorities, points to glaring gaps in international solidarity.

The concentrated location of ethnic minorities, particularly Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, and Baluchis near the western and southeastern borders, provides a geographic lens into how the Iranian regime takes out its dissatisfaction with the economic and political performance of the center on the mostly non-Persian periphery. In light of this persecution, the strategic erasure of religious and ethnic minority voices in both western and Iranian media becomes a boon to the Islamic Republic, bolstered by the historic and growing importance of proving one’s religious ideology and nationalist ideology to the Persian, Shi’a state. Any question of these ideologies is considered a license for the state to increase the already considerable and, in some cases, apartheid-level repression of minorities.

Populations associated with border regions are all at risk of extreme violence. Iran, which executes more people than any country in the world after China, reportedly executed more than 50 Baluchis in 2006 alone. Just recently, the New York Times published an article citing local news media and witnesses who say that around 50 Afghan migrants were murdered and their bodies thrown into a river. Structural racism against non-Persians in Iran also means that Kurds saw the highest number of executions following the 2009 Green protests, even though the movement itself was Persian-led and Tehran-centered. According to Abbas Vali, professor of modern social and political theory at the department of sociology, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, Iranian Kurdistan is treated as a security zone where “the logic of military rule” continues to this day. “It’s something engraved in the mindset of government officials,” continues Vali, “when they smell trouble, they first turn to the Kurds.” This violent racism has also led the government to systematically murder working-class Kurdish kolbers, or laborers who carry heavy goods on their back, many of whom are impoverished children from border town villages. Just in 2016, 42 kolber workers were directly shot dead, 30 were injured, and 22 drowned/died of hypothermia or other related causes.

Indeed, the state violence faced by the Persian center during the suppression of sporadic uprisings is an everyday reality for ethnic and religious minorities throughout Iran. As Iranian lawyer Gissou Nia has pointed out, many commentators based in the West, especially diaspora Persians, tend to severely misjudge anti-government protests in Iran because they fail to amplify or even listen to the voices of minorities that make up the backbone of current revolutionary movements. The projection of the urbanized Persian center as being representative of Iran is only solidified by media outlets who assume interviewing Persian-Americans alone is enough of a perspective on envisioning Iran and how to engage with the Iranian state. After all, when was the last time an Iranian Lur or Ahwazi was given a global platform to voice their opinion on Iran’s regime or western foreign policy towards Iran? How can non-recognized religious minorities such as Bahai’s or Sikhs speak globally from within a state that affords them no protections?

Torture and repression

There is a unique set of consequences for minorities who speak out their grievances with the state, for anything said can be treated with the gravity of a “national security threat.” As the Iranian economy fails to provide for the non-elite and non-central populations, more revolutionary movements are sparked and quashed through targeted efforts to disenfranchise minorities. Any form of supposed connection to a “militant” group in Iran becomes grounds for execution. According to reports gathered by Iran Human Rights (IHR) between 2010 and 2018, among the 118 people who have been executed for affiliation with banned political and militant groups, there were 65 Kurds (55%), 29 Baluchis (25%) and 15 Arabs (13%), most of whom were Sunni Muslims in addition to being ethnic minorities.

The torture of imprisoned minorities in Iran is especially gruesome and sobering. Labor activist Sepideh Gholian, arrested for a notable strike in the southern province of Khuzestan, spoke out upon her temporary release on the torture of hundreds of Ahwazi women forced to “confess” that their husbands were members of Da’esh (ISIS). The escalation of violence against Ahwazis in Khuzestan has gone hand in hand with increased interest in development projects in the resource-rich province, often displacing Ahwazis for projects that divert natural resources back to Tehran and other urban areas of the Persian-speaking center. In Iran’s November uprisings, at least 100 Ahwazi demonstrators were killed and 2,500 imprisoned. Ahwazis are regularly imprisoned under fabricated ties to international terror, often without any public acknowledgement. Baluchis also face torture and forced confession of association with militant groups such as Jundallah. This April, Baluchi prisoner Abdulvaset Dahani was executed in Zahedan’s Central Prison after writing to the world on experiences of torture and forced confession:

“They tied my hands and suspended me from the ceiling. They subjected me to ‘grilled chicken’ torture. They hit on the soles of my feet with a cable burned it with atomic lighters.”

In March of 2020, when the Iranian government responded to hunger strikes and prison rebellions by selectively releasing prisoners during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, prisoners in Tehran were prioritized, and therefore ethnic minorities were far less likely to see freedom. No prisoner with “national security threat” listed on their charge sheet was eligible for release, a restriction which severely narrows the number of prisoners in Iran from lenient treatment and effectively bars ethnic minorities from release. While international praise for this selective release of prisoners ran high, the state nonetheless executed prisoners at an even higher rate than usual. Within ten days of April, 25 executions were recorded.

Second-class citizenship

Religious minorities are likewise at risk of being accused of having “dual loyalties.” Jewish and Baha’i Iranians are denigrated by propaganda that associates them with Zionism and the State of Israel. This accusation naturally leads to an atmosphere of fear, as Iranian Jews have family ties in Israel and the headquarters of the Baha’i faith are in Haifa. Likewise, only a subset of the small Sikh minority in Iran have been able to receive Iranian passports despite living in the country for generations. Cremation is illegal in Iran, and the Sikh minority faces dangerous backlash for their practice. For years, the only place Sikhs have been able to legally engage in their funeral rites is at a cremation site hidden within the Indian embassy grounds in Tehran, a 24 hour train ride from the historic Sikh population center of Zahedan. Armenians also struggle with the image of being perpetual foreigners despite being present in the region for over a thousand years. Churches are monitored by the police, as any utterance or distribution of materials on Christianity in the Persian language is grounds for arrest.

Tests of ideology hinder opportunities for religious minorities beyond the realm of their religious practice. Exams legally implemented by the Islamic Republic to prove one’s loyalty to the state religion prevent people from exercising complete citizenship rights. One cannot work in the public sector in Iran, for example, without passing examinations that prove loyalty to the state-sanctioned, Khomeinist version of Shi’a Islam. Theoretically recognized religious minorities (Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians) may work in lower-rank positions should they pass an examination, but the segregation of the education system bars candidates from having the requisite familiarity with Islam to realistically pass. Furthermore, there has been a massive push by the regime to allocate and prioritize more positions for members of the Basij, Iran’s voluntary paramilitary organization, which staunchly adheres to Khomeinism.

In the realm of higher education, recognized religious minorities are consistently at odds with the efforts to Islamize any aspect of the university. Moreover, non-recognized religious minorities such as Baha’is are officially forbidden from higher education. The underground universities run by the Baha’i community face the constant threat of raids, arrests, and even execution for their work. Perhaps the most telling example of Iran’s stance towards the human value of non-recognized religious minorities can be seen through the qisas system or “retaliation in kind.” Retaliation of violence is allowed by a victim’s family, unless the victim’s family forgives the perpetrator or accepts a deal through “blood money.” However, if a Muslim kills a member of an non-recognized religious minority, there is no qisas requirement. In fact, no punishment is specified, giving judges the right to pursue no consequences for the murder of a non-recognized religious minority, even if the perpetrator is found guilty of a willful crime. The murder of Baha’is is effectively permissible in Iran.

Denying refugees’ right to exist

Afghan refugees are another vulnerable group that can legally be treated as subhuman. Iran’s population is estimated to be 82 million and there are up to 4 million Afghan refugees living in the country, yet 27 out of 31 provinces have partial or complete bans on the residence of Afghans. This cruel legislation is ironically most enforced in border regions across the country. Some provinces such as Sistan-Baluchistan which sits at the tri-border between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, allow Afghans to reside in urban areas, such as the capital of Zahedan, but not in the rest of the province. This prevents Afghans from moving freely and seeking opportunities for livelihoods. Each year the Iranian government chips away at opportunities to seek asylum or refugee status, and provides no legal recourse to those sentenced to deportation. Afghan children are often channeled into modern-day slavery and families are forced to pay exorbitant sums to be transported between locations or to live in unsanitary camps. Human Rights Watch has released several reports on Afghan child soldiers being sent to Syria by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the IRGC) as well.

Military expansionism

In addition to domestic repression, the Iranian regime’s violence extends beyond its borders and into the rest of western Asia. This fact tends to remain hidden from popular narratives, given that both U.S. war hawks and much of the so-called “anti-war” left analyze Iranian foreign policy from a deeply U.S.-centric perspective. For the latter, this viewpoint results in a flawed analysis where almost all of Iran’s actions are bizarrely seen as defending itself — or Palestine — from western imperialism. This perception used to be understandable, given the West’s treacherous history of meddling in modern Iranian affairs (support for the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mossadeq, backing of the Shah dictatorship, support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war, etc).

However, in reality, the main external target of the Revolutionary Guards for almost a decade has not been American or Israeli soldiers, as Iran’s “resistance” narrative would have outsiders believe, but Syrian civilians. While Russia intervened to save the throne of the Assad dynasty in 2015, Iran and its proxies, most notably Lebanese Hezbollah, have been a main source of Bashar al-Assad’s ground troops since the early days of the Syrian revolution. This reality on the ground is the reason why many Syrians who supported Iran against the hypocritical U.S.-Israeli stance on its nuclear program later questioned the timing of the Obama administration’s nuclear deal, which was signed at the height of the Iranian-backed genocide in Syria.

The irony of Iran’s role in the Syrian war, of course, is that the state has justified its military intervention with the same arguments used by George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Saudi Arabia to justify the killing of civilians in Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen: that they are only fighting “terrorists” and protecting “national security.” In doing so, the Iranian regime and its apologists are repeating the exact “war on terror” logic with regards to Syria that they once used at home to justify the slaughter of thousands of Kurds during the 1979 Iranian Kurdish uprising.

Unfortunately, Iran’s state propaganda line on the Syrian war has been bought by far too many western activists and journalists across the political spectrum; as a result, few, if any, of the articles on sanctions (whether in favor of or against them) have not even bothered mentioning how Iranian and Iranian-backed occupation forces continue to prop up the Assad regime, responsible for the overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in Syria. With or without the U.S.-led sanctions, Iran’s mobilization of a transnational Shi’a army in support of Assad has remained one of the few constants throughout the Syrian war and a key driver of the very Sunni extremism that Iran claims to combat in the Levant.

Toward a new transnational movement

Since the reinstatement of economic sanctions by the Trump administration, the Iranian regime has propped up a victimhood narrative that exploits the suffering of the general population and the doubly marginalized within the nation. Examples of mass suffering, human rights violations, and discrimination have been blamed on the regime’s economic hardships. To the extent that when international movements against economic sanctions make mention of Iran’s mistreatment of its people, these are deemed mere “mismanagement” by the government. The conditions experienced by the marginalized populations of Iran have been severely exacerbated in recent years, but the state structures which prioritize Persian-speaking Shi’a Muslims precede the sanctions era. Furthermore, in the years of relative economic stability and opening of freedoms in the center and among the dominant population of Iran, there was little relief for minorities.

The erasure of minority voices from international solidarity movements actively benefits hawkish right-wing organizations, who have proven to be much more willing to make space for critical voices of the Iranian regime. The fight to end unjust sanctions and the fight to instill revolutionary equality in Iran are only mutually exclusive as long as international observers and activists continue to view the Iranian regime as the primary victim. But the fact of the matter is that the ruling elite remain well-fed, resource-rich, and better equipped to fight COVID-19, while the minorities that comprise the core of the working-class movement face their darkest days.

Related news

Stay updated with the latest news

February 15, 2025

UNPO Supports the Ogoni People in High Court Case Against Shell for Oil Pollution

February 14, 2025

UNPO Submits Input to EMPRIP for Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to their Traditional Economies

February 11, 2025

Celebrating 34 Years of the UNPO!

Scroll to Top
Subscribe to our Newsletter

By joining you accept receiving commercial communications from UNPO. You can retire your consent whenever you want in our privacy policy.

Dr Liam Saddington

Dr. Liam Saddington is a political and environmental geographer focused on the geopolitical impacts of climate change, particularly for small island states and the rising sea levels. His research on the UK’s evolving role in the South Pacific offers key insights into environmental degradation and displacement. He co-developed the Model UNPO, bringing conflict resolution and debates on human rights and environmental justice to UK schools. He serves as the academic advisor for the UNPO Youth Network and contributes to study sessions in partnership with the Council of Europe, contributing his expertise to global advocacy efforts.

Alexandra Gavilano

Alexandra Gavilano is an environmental scientist and climate justice decolonisation and democracy activist. With a focus on environmental protection, democratic decision-making, and personal and collective adaptation, Gavilano brings a wealth of experience in grassroots activism and advocacy to UNPO. As a climate and food justice activist, Gavilano has co-launched initiatives and associations that address social and ecological challenges. Her focus lies on system change for environmental protection, strengthening of democratic decision-making, and personal and collective deep adaptation. She serves as UNPO’s Sustainable Empowerment Campaign advisor.

Prof Francesco Palermo

Francesco Palermo is a professor of comparative constitutional law at the University of Verona and Director of the Institute for Comparative Federalism at Eurac Research in Bolzano/Bozen. He worked for the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and was member and president of the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. From 2013 to 2018 he served as a non-party member of the Italian Senate, Member of the Scientific Committee of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU for the term 2018-2023 and Constitutional Adviser to the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Autonomies since 2019. He has authored over 300 publications, including 11 monographs and 36 edited volumes. He serves as UNPO’s Democratic Pluralism advisor.

Dr Tenzin Dorjee

Tenzin Dorjee, also known as Tendor, is a Tibetan writer, activist, and scholar based in New York, specializing in nonviolent resistance and the intersection of religion, politics, and conflict. His work, including the book ‘The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle’, reflects his deep commitment to human rights and political change. He combines academia and activism, with a strong academic background from Brown and Columbia, he has also led organizations like Students for a Free Tibet and the Tibet Action Institute.

Prof Fiona McConnell

Fiona McConnell is a Professor of Political Geography at the University of Oxford and a Tutorial Fellow in Geography at St Catherine’s College, Oxford. Her research, which began with a focus on the exiled Tibetan government, now explores governance beyond the state and the articulation of political legitimacy by marginalized communities. Since joining the UNPO in 2012, she has been instrumental in developing the Unrepresented Diplomats Training Program and the Model UNPO, and co-authored influential reports on compromised spaces. As a political geographer, Fiona’s research aims to develop new areas of thinking regarding governance beyond the state, and has been Awarded the Philip Leverhulme Prize and the Back Award. Fiona’s work continues to shape the discourse on self-determination and diplomacy.

Dr Michael van Walt van Praag

Dr. Michael van Walt van Praag is a distinguished international lawyer and expert in intra-state conflict resolution, known for his foundational role as the first General Secretary of the UNPO. In addition to his involvement with our organization, Dr. van Walt possesses extensive experience in facilitating peace processes and mediation, having facilitated peace talks throughout the world and lent his expertise as an advisor and consultant to governmental and non-governmental organizations engaged in such processes. He currently serves as executive president of Kreddha and is a Senior Fellow at the Sompong Sucharitkul Center. In 2020, he was awarded a knighthood by the King and the Dutch government for his exceptional global contributions to conflict resolution and the rights of oppressed peoples.

Putheany Kim

Putheany Kim, mostly known as Kim, is a dedicated young activist passionate about human rights and environmental justice. Inspired by her father and driven by her aspiration to become a human rights ambassador, Kim has committed herself to promote a more equitable and sustainable future. Her work emphasizes collaboration, as she has built strong alliances with organizations and fellow activists recognising the power of unity in effecting meaningful change.

Senator Paul Strauss

Paul Strauss, is an American politician and attorney serving as the senior United States shadow senator for the District of Columbia since 1997. As a member of the Democratic Party, he advocated for D.C. statehood and federal representation. Strauss, also a former chairperson of the District’s Board of Real Property Assessments and Appeals and a union organizer, is the principal of the Law Offices of Paul Strauss & Associates, P.C. He has been involved in various local and national political roles, including a significant role in the “51 Stars” campaign for D.C. statehood and international advocacy efforts. He has testified before the U.S. Senate, engaged with international bodies, and is an honorary member of the Global Committee for the Rule of Law.

Tammy Breedt

Tammy, born in Johannesburg, South Africa, is a dedicated politician and activist. She studied at the University of the Free State, where she was a student activist and served on the Student Representative Council. Tammy has been an active member of the Freedom Front Plus since 2006 and served in the Free State Legislature until 2019. After the 2019 General Elections, she became one of the first female Members of Parliament for the party, serving as the National Spokesperson on Agriculture, Environmental Affairs, Social Development, Women, and Youth. Currently the Deputy Chairperson of the party in the Free State, Tammy also leads the foreign relations and internationalization committee.

Elisenda Paluzie

Professor Elisenda Paluzie is a prominent economist at the University of Barcelona, where she served as Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Business from 2009 to 2017. She holds an MA in in International and Development Economics from Yale University and a PhD in Economics from the University of Barcelona. With research experience from the London School of Economics, CERAS-ENPC in Paris, and Kyoto University, her work focuses on regional and urban economics and international trade. She served as President of the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) from 2018 to 2022.

Rubina Greenwood

Dr. Rubina Greenwood is a prominent Sindh human rights advocate with more than 20 years of experience raising awareness on the human rights issues affecting the Sindh community in Pakistan. She is the President and founder of the International Sindhi Women’s Origination (ISWO) and President of the World Sindhi Congress (WSC). She has a Phd in Architecture from University of Glasgow and she is currently Director of Network Integration for the Network Rail Consulting.

Mercè Monje Cano

Mercè Monje Cano is a socio-cultural project manager and accomplished human rights advocate with over fifteen years of experience in advocacy, project management and strategic planning. Before her appointment as UNPO Secretary General, she had been serving as the Executive Director and Head of Programmes at the UNPO, where she also acted as the UN Representative. She has managed programmes, led numerous UN advocacy efforts, coordinate various human rights initiatives, and led trainings on advocacy techniques, showcasing her expertise in advancing the rights of minorities, indigenous peoples, and unrepresented groups.