If we want to address these issues, a deeper analysis of one cease-fire agreement negotiated by the ruling military government State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is needed. The worst disillusionment from a cease-fire agreement may have resulted from the one negotiated by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Burma government in June 1995. Today, the eight-year-old cease-fire in Mon State is still holding but barely.

Nai Shwe Kyin formed the NMSP and its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) in July 1958. Operating in southern Mon State, northern Tenasserim Division and the southernmost tip of Karen State, the NMSP has fought Burma’s army for more than forty years. In 1989, following the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma and cease-fire negotiations with around fifteen other rebel groups, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was able to launch full-scale military offensives against the different armies which were active members of the National Democratic Front (NDF) such as the MNLA and the Karen National Union. Thus, the NMSP lost control of its headquarters located near Three Pagoda’s Pass in February 1990. This region represented their main source of income. At least, 30,000 people fled from the area at this time.

Weakened, the NMSP also faced growing political pressure from Thai officials willing to invest in Mon State. Foreign oil companies had also proposed a natural gas pipeline through contested areas of Mon State. This caused the Rangoon regime and Thai government to exert even greater pressure on the NMSP to negotiate a cease-fire. The Yadana gas pipeline started to be built in 1991. Surveying for the pipeline route caused an immediate result of forcibly relocating the local population to villages with military outposts. At that time, military authorities also forced more than 20,000 Mon people to work as slave labourers on a new rail line connecting the southern cities of Tavoy and Ye. The railway was built to allow supplies to be delivered to the Yadana gas field. Increasing its pressure, Thailand decided in 1994 to forcibly relocate Mon refugee camps back inside NMSP controlled territories in Burma. Shortly after the repatriation, Burmese troops torched some of these camps.

After several inconclusive rounds of talks, the NMSP finally agreed to a cease-fire in 1995, admitting that the organisation was no longer able to guarantee the safety of its own people. Forced labour had dramatically increased in the area and Mon IDPs living in the relocated camps were harassed daily. At that time, the NMSP and Mon people thought that the cease-fire could open a way for a forthcoming political settlement that recognised the rights of Mon people and encouraged development programs. The cease-fire agreement was only made orally and nothing was signed between the parties. The NMSP was allowed to keep its arms and some territory. But, the group had to cede large tracts of land as part of the agreement where the MNLA was located before. Only 20 permanent Mon areas were delimitated. Within one year, the NMSP gradually handed over eight of them, including two strategic outposts in Tavoy district, where the Yadana pipeline was planned to cross to Thailand. After the cease-fire was reached, MNLA soldiers required travel-passes to go through SPDC controlled areas. The same condition was imposed on SPDC troops to go into Mon areas but this was never respected. The NMSP was also granted seventeen business concessions in 1997. However, the regime cancelled the majority of the contracts by 1998. Finally, some development programs in Mon territory that were also promised by Rangoon were never implemented. These failed promises cultivated a growing distrust among the Mon population of the actual benefits of the cease-fire agreement. The NMSP also became increasingly weaker and life conditions deteriorated in Mon State. The SPDC has always refused to negotiate a political agreement. The result of the cease-fire on NMSP and Mon people was devastating in terms of territory, strength and life conditions.

If we want to address the root causes of this failed settlement, several factors must be analysed.

Firstly, a valid cease-fire is an agreement that organises cessation of any kind of military activities at a precise time in a given place. It is an initial confidence-building measure agreed on between the parties. It needs to be agreed on under the monitoring of a neutral mediator and written down and signed by both parties. This never happened during the Mon negotiation. Disarmament is also a fundamental step that must be followed. The SPDC offered the NMSP to “Exchange Arms for Peace” without ever asking for those arms to be given back. How can peace be guaranteed when soldiers retain their weapons and uniforms? How can fighting not resume in such a “militarised” state? Disappointed by the result of the Mon cease-fire, many former NMSP soldiers broke away and formed splinter groups such as the Monland Restoration Army. It was a fragile and fake peace.

Secondly, besides Rangoon’s total unwillingness to negotiate a sustainable cease-fire, the NMSP cease-fire process was also undermined by the critical influence and pressure of Thailand, foreign companies, and business interests. In 1993, NMSP representatives declared that Thai authorities had offered to mediate peace with Rangoon and clear the way for a gas pipeline. The Thai National Security Council has always rejected reports alleging such pressure. But later in 1994, Thailand which usually held a liberal policy of accepting Burmese refugees began to send Mon people back to camps inside Burma. Thailand’s policy reversal was based on its desire to pursue commercial ties with Burma, including the major natural gas agreement which was signed later in 1995. By forcing repatriation of more than 10,000 Mon refugees inside Burma, Thai authorities also “offered” free labour to the Rangoon government for the construction of both projects: the Ye-Tavoy railway and the Yadana pipeline. Both governments benefited from this repatriation and use of forced labour. Today the railway and the Yadana pipeline are built and both Burma and Thailand are enjoying huge financial profit.

The environment surrounding the Mon cease-fire agreement was totally biased, unbalanced and violent. The NMSP and Mon people faced growing pressure from both Burma’s army and Thailand. It was a non-voluntary agreement of a ‘take it or leave it’ offer. A legal cease-fire is supposed to stop the armed conflict in order to bring a start of confidence building between parties for real peace talks. A cease-fire agreement is one of several confidence-building measures, which are supposed to be followed by a long process of peace negotiations. It is just a first step towards peace. It is not possible to make such progress when one party faced great pressure from the other, when those at the table were already on unequal footing. Confidence cannot emerge from such circumstances. The Mon cease-fire process was only another way to control people within the actual constructs of the cease-fire itself. In the end, the Burmese troops were deployed to gain further territory and the Rangoon Government gained more power over ethnic areas.

In Burma, the so-called cease-fire process has nothing in common with a legal cease-fire. In the Burmese context, a cease-fire is understood and managed as a final measure in itself which must establish lasting peace. Burma’s government never really intended to implement a valid peace process: from the strict beginning of the pre-negotiation phase where a cease-fire agreement must be reached, to the substantial negotiation of the peace agreement, and finally the crucial implementation phase. Without an alternative to war or militarisation Burma will be condemned to endless rounds of armed conflict.