It could be argued that the situation in Cabinda, today, resembles that of East-Timor a decade ago before the Dili massacre was caught live on camera, drawing the world’s attention to the brutality of Indonesian army occupation. The question arises, do we need the war in Cabinda to escalate into a similar massacre to secure international intervention, or is the situation of such little importance to the international community, necessitating little more than half-hearted conscience-clearing intervention attempts. Unfortunately, there is significant truth in these observations, while other important factors also play a determining role. Angola continues to be torn apart by UNITA’s guerrilla war. The former is also an active role-player in the DRC conflict. This situation of regional turmoil is overshadowing the conflict in Cabinda, with very little media attention paid to the latter. The Angolan state desperately needs revenues from Cabinda’s oil wealth to finance its war effort against UNITA. Oil multinationals, backed by their governments, seek sustained guarantees and protection of their large investments in the region. Chevron, Elf, Texaco, Agip and Energy Africa have invested more than US$ 8 billion in Angola, producing almost 1 million barrels crude oil per day, accounting for 80% of Angolan state revenues. Against this background, it becomes clear why any sustainable peace, based on the recognition of the Cabindan peoples’ right to self-determination, remains elusive. In their struggle for the recognition of this right, the Cabindan people continues to face almost insurmountable odds of Angolan military supremacy, repression, impoverishment, material destruction and appalling health conditions. While Angola and multinationals continue to tap its oil wealth, the people has seen very little of these revenues ploughed back into Cabinda’s development. Furthermore, the Angolan government has shown little or no intention at all to negotiate with the Cabindan representatives.

The tragedy of Cabinda is that it once came very close to full independence, yet instead untold suffering was to be its destiny. In 1964, Cabinda was listed by the OAU as the 39th African state to be decolonised. At that time it was a territorial entity (Portuguese protectorate) recognised by the 1933 Portuguese Constitution, distinct from Angola. When Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, it subsequently occupied Cabinda, with the complicity of the then Portuguese government. This fact constitutes a main difference with the East Timor case. While Portugal effectively lost control of the latter in 1975 when Fretilin unilaterally declared independence, only to be invaded by Indonesia afterwards, in legal terms, it had never relinquished its governance there. For this reason Portugal actively (though belatedly), supported East Timor’s struggle for self-determination. In contrast, Portugal never consulted the people of Cabinda or included representatives of Cabinda in the pre-independence negotiations. Since this date, Cabinda has remained under military occupation by Angola, the outcome of a violation of international treaties (the Luso-Cabinda Treaties of 1883/84/85), as well as indifference of the international community to undo this injustice. The Cabindan people were confronted by the reality of a harsh, costly and uneven struggle for self-determination, peace and sustained development. In 1963, the Frente para a Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC), became the small 'flag carrier' of this struggle, intensified since 1984. Another player is the Cabinda Democratic Front.

The critical problem of Cabinda has been ignored for too long. As a result, FLEC forces are resorting to increasingly desperate (even counterproductive) measures to secure some international recognition and intervention, particularly by Portugal. The current hostage taking drama involving Portuguese citizens emphasises this. It has to be realised that for Portugal, all issues relating to Angola are very delicate, due to the pressure of legal treaties and the presence of colonial guilt. However, there is some hope that the international community, and particularly Portugal’s indifference is beginning to change. The Portuguese journalist, Jose Manuel Silva, with his recent filming of the activities of FLEC-FAC freedom fighters, has made a small, albeit valuable contribution towards informing the outside world of the almost forgotten war in Cabinda. His video is entitled 'Cabinda - Independence or Death'. Similarly, the Portuguese are becoming more critical to the injustice of the 1975 Alvor Accords. Reference is made to communiqués by General Silvino Silverio Marques, former governor of the Portuguese administration in Cabinda, and the pretender to the Portuguese throne, Duke Duarte Pio of Braganza, questioning the legality of Portugal’s handling of the transfer of Cabinda to Angola (Lusomundo, 9 February 2001, and Lusa, 18 February 2001, respectively).

The UNPO International Secretariat continues its efforts on behalf of Cabinda. We are regularly in contact with Mr Francisco Builo, Cabinda’s representative in The Netherlands. Dr Joël Batila of FLEC-FAC attended UNPO’s Sixth General Assembly in Tallinn, Estonia, where his contribution saw the adoption of a resolution supporting the case of Cabinda. A request was made for an eventual UNPO mission to Cabinda to assess the situation. At the request of Cabinda representatives, UNPO dispatched urgent letters to the President of the EU Parliament, Me N. Fontaine, and to Dr Mario Soares, former president of Portugal, requesting these eminent persons to fully consider all the important issues surrounding the Cabinda case during their deliberations, particularly regarding mediation efforts to end the hostage crisis and to find a lasting solution to the conflict.

(Reference: Mbendi Information for Africa: Angola Oil and Gas Industry, http://mbendi.co.za)