Apr 05, 2005

EU Must Keep Sanctions on Burma


UNPO addresses an open letter to the European Commission on the "Independent" report, which supports Burmas National Reconciliation Process, presented on the occasion of the "Burma Day 2005
Untitled Document

BURMA: OPEN LETTER TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE INDEPENDENT REPORT

Supporting Burma/Myanmar’s National Reconciliation Process: Challenges And Opportunities”, PRESENTED ON THE OCCASION OF THE “BURMA DAY 2005”

 

Open letter to:

Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for the External Relations
Josè Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission
And to the Members of the European Parliament


5 April 2005

Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner,
President Barroso,

We are disconcerted and worried by the news that the European Commission is currently considering an independent report on Burma recommending that Europe restore diplomatic and economic relations with the Rangoon regime, as well as recommence foreign aid programs.

This “alternative approach” proposed by the report is based on its conclusion that the internal pro-democracy forces have failed to offer an effective response to the regime. Their failure, says the report, has further weakened and reduced the chances of restoring a civilian government in the country; therefore, in their view, the only possible solution lies with a policy of the EU recognising and opening discussions with the junta.

We believe that the “alternative approach” suggested by the Taylor/Pederson report would legitimize and reinforce the military junta, which has committed serious violations of international law and fundamental human rights with total impunity.
Moreover, the European Commission is about to consider an analysis of the internal political situation of the country that does not seem to take into account the opinions and position of the internal opposition, led by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Su Kyi, who remains under house arrest, and of the pro-democracy Burmese movements who have been suffering violent repression for over 15 years.

Once again, we are witnessing the return of a “policy of dialogue” with tyrannical regimes, in the vain hope that it will encourage the start of a democratic process, while we know that this hope is, in fact, groundless. As history has taught us - from Suharto to Milosevic - this “policy of dialogue” can only contribute to the preservation of an anti-democratic, repressive and freedom-less status quo.

We were surprised to learn that the representatives of the National League for Democracy have not been invited to participate in such a consultation; rather, they have been identified as one of the reasons of the disorders, enhancing the administrative control by the Rangoon government and in effectively hindering the birth of political change within the country.
The report, which is accorded so much credibility by the European Commission and is very far away from the position and the decisions made by the European Parliament, appears, then, to be more important than what is denounced by the most reliable international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House. It also contradicts U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report, which affirms that no security agenda and no drive for development will be successful unless they are based on the protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human rights and democracy.

We would like to highlight that such an independent report is being discussed during the same days when, at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the situation of human rights in Burma is sharply criticised and denounced and it is being affirmed that only strong pressure by world democracies can avoid further violence and repression by the cruel Burmese military junta. It is being discussed at a time when the presence in the same Commission of tyrannies and dictatorships is being debated. It is being discussed at a time when world democracies have recently created the Democracy Caucus and are about to meet together in Santiago del Chile for the Third Ministerial Conference of Communities of Democracies to create and reinforce a policy based on freedom, democracy and the rule of law, rather than on real politik.

We consider it to be extremely important for the European Commission to reconfirm the sanctions adopted by the same Commission and by a number of resolutions of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe and to reconsider the Taylor/Pedersen report, also in light of cooperation both with those international human rights organizations most committed to the Burmese situation and with the Burmese pro-democracy organizations that are under constant risk of deportation, torture and death because of their work.

We believe that the Taylor/Pedersen should immediately be made public and open to debate and analysis by the European Parliament, rather than remain secret in the parallel agendas of the European bureaucracies.
Finally, we would like to re-launch the appeal begun by Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been under house arrest since 2003, and by her supporters in the free world, first of all the Western democracies: “Please, use your liberty to promote ours”.

 

Signatories:

Transnational Radical Party (TRP)
Unrepresented Nations and People Organisation (UNPO)
No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ)
Hands off Cain (HOC)
International Antiprohibitionist League (IAL)
Radicali Italiani


The Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (Altsean-Burma) urges the European Commission to reject an "independent" report on Burma for being anti-democratic and claiming that democracy will not benefit the country. In addition, the human rights group also calls for the EC to postpone its April 5 Burma Day event until it is redesigned to be inclusive and representative. The report and the Burma Day event, to be held in Brussels, has attracted growing opposition from pro-democracy groups around the world.

The "independent" report for the European Commission titled "Supporting Burma/Myanmars National Reconciliation Process: Challenges and Opportunities" dated January 2005 essentially argues that democracy will not benefit Burma. Such a bizarre claim flouts the proven desire of the people of Burma for democracy and commensurate economic reform.

Ironically, this push to erode the EUs commitment to democracy in Burma takes place when support for Burmese democracy is growing in Southeast Asia.

The authors say the outlook for establishing a nominally democratic government in the near future is positive. It is strange that they would recommend the EU "nominally" support democracy, reconciliation and human rights in Burma. Altsean-Burma questions whether the authors themselves would be content to be subjected to life under the Burmese military regime, or a "nominally democratic" government.

The October purge of Khin Nyunt resulted in the loss of the main communication channels between the international community and the regime. This has in turn led to a sense of desperation amongst those foreigners whose careers depend on "engagement", who now advocate appeasement disguised as engagement. They hope that such bribery will allow them a foot in the hardliners door.

Altsean-Burma wishes to respond to some of the points made in the report as follows:

1. The report dismisses Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as being incapable of drawing public support.

Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD drew huge crowds during her travels throughout the country in 2002/2003. The signature campaign calling for her release has already attracted 500,000 signatures in Burma, despite intimidation and harassment by the military authorities.* This has reinforced awareness of the national aspiration for democracy, as expressed in the 1990 elections, in which the NLD won 82% of the parliamentary seats.

*(During a recent meeting at the NLD headquarters in Rangoon, a member of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines discovered that 500,000 people has signed the petition calling for Aung San Suu Kyis release. When asked whether the people were afraid to sign the petition, the NLD members replied "Yes people are afraid but they are signing anyway").

2. They argue that civilians in Burma are not capable of managing policy in a democratic Burma: "it is questionable whether a civilian government would have the capacity to deal with the immense structural obstacles to peace and development."

The argument is arrogant and condescending - the SPDC is clearly inept at economic and policy reform. The SPDC has purposefully undermined capacity development opportunities as a strategy to subjugate the people of Burma.

The authors appear to suggest that a regime which continues to loot, rape, perpetrate forced labor and forcibly recruit child soldiers will somehow transform into a capable government, once given enough money. This is tantamount to saying the Ukrainian dictatorship should have been supported because Ukrainians were too inexperienced for democracy.

3. They say Burma has "none of the markers of a country likely to make an easy and permanent transition to a democratic regime." Where there is "ethnic and religious conflict" or where the sense of "national unity and identity" is weak, there are fewer prospects for sustaining democracy.

This argument has long been used by the SPDC it ignores the fact that the military junta has facilitated ethnic and religious conflicts in order to justify their continued dominance.

It also ignores the inspiring solidarity that has been demonstrated amongst ethnic nationality groups in recent years, for example the formation of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (comprising ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups), and the joint proposals of ceasefire groups to the National Convention. All the major ethnic nationality groups have advocated for a united, federal system.

4. They claim the difficulties experienced during Burmas early experience with democracy underscores the need for a "strong" government.

This plays into the SPDC argument that the country is "too fragile" to survive on its own under civilian rule. Strong governments are those where the stakeholders are invested and people are represented. The peoples will was made obvious in the Burmese general elections, and clearly still applies.

It is disgraceful that a report that reeks of colonialism, and to a certain extent, racism, can have currency today. Such assertions seem to be informed by the attitude that somehow the Burmese are less deserving of democracy and are less capable of sustaining democracy. Burmas early experience with democracy took place over 4 decades ago. The report insults the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma by attempting to overlook pro-democratic developments that have occurred there in recent times.

At this point, Altsean-Burma wishes to acknowledge that while many people from Burma may not have the ability to glibly spout political science terms, they definitely know what they want, and have faced great dangers to express their wishes.

5. The authors also make the hollow argument that enhanced engagement is more likely to influence the SPDC and its institutions, a point disproved by the experience of corporate engagement in the 1990s.

Further, they argue that to contribute to social change, international actors need to be "engaged on the ground" in close proximity to the people/institutions want to influence. EU policy should aim for constructive dialogue with the SPDC.

UN Envoys including Razali Ismail, Sergio Pinheiro, several Nobel Laureates and Thailand (through the Bangkok Process) have all attempted constructive dialogue. In all of these cases, it has failed. Why should the EU be any different? Constructive dialogue has only led to a tradition of broken promises. Now, this tradition has afforded the SPDC enough confidence to implement the National Convention a blatant attempt to constitutionalize their dictatorship.

6. One of their main arguments is that the country is more open to foreign influence than previously: e.g. having senior officials exposed to the outside world helped overcome their fear of foreigners.

This logic is based on the assumption that dictators like Milosevic, Marcos and Suharto would have changed if only we had spoken nicely to them. The regimes receptiveness to "foreign influence" has been a response to pressure. Key overtures to engage foreign governments have taken place only when there has been pressure. For instance, the regime paid significant amounts to Washington lobbyists and publicists to "engage" the U.S. government when they were subjected to U.S. pressure, in stark contrast to its contempt for ASEAN, which pursues "constructive engagement".

On the business front, the SPDCs monopoly over Burmas formal economy means that greater foreign business engagement will only enhance their military expansion and their procurement of weapons.

7. They say that renewed pressure is more likely to disrupt domestic process of change and further punish the general population.

The "domestic process of change" is a euphemism for reconsolidation of the dictatorship. Nine political parties that won 91% of the seats in the election are absent from the National Convention.

The authors use the KNU gentlemans ceasefire as an example of a positive development. This overlooks the actual dynamics of a ceasefire zone: Reports from Karen areas since the gentlemans ceasefire in December 2003, have pointed to heightened insecurity for civilian populations, including a raid on a Karen community during Karen New Year on January 10, 2005. Even as the KNU remains open to a ceasefire despite these provocations, the regime still refuses to commit to a formal one.

The authors congratulate the SPDCs "infrastructure development program". SPDC-style "development" has meant improved military access to commit forced labor, exploitation of natural resources and exploitation of the civilian population.

8. They argue that there is little room for negotiating genuine political reform given the "very obvious corporate and personal interests they [the SPDC] have in maintaining power."

This undermines their entire argument - if you recognize that there is no desire for political reform, why advocate rewarding the regime for this? This is precisely why the EU should adopt comprehensive sanctions. When the personal interests of the generals are directly at stake, the dialogue table might finally get some meat on it.

9. The authors argue that sanctions should be revised in favor of more realistic benchmarks for progress whereby the EU reciprocates with concrete, positive gestures when steps are taken. The authors berate the international community for "failing" to promote economic reform, but absolves the SPDC of all responsibility.

The international community HAS promoted economic reform it has always been very clear that sanctions and International Financial Institution prohibitions were a direct response to poor economic management and governance. Were those management policies to change, the international community would change alongside. Benchmarks have been offered for example, the initiation of a genuine tripartite dialogue. Japan, Malaysia and Singapore have all tried to encourage economic reforms, but failed because they were not willing to back these encouragements with firmness. The SPDC has had ample opportunity for reform, but has only opted to take steps forward when faced with pressure.

10. They make a particular point of arguing that the SPDC is not vulnerable to pressure.

This argument is based on the fact that the SPDC controls "every lever of power" but ignores the fact that this control is also vulnerability. Without the backing of public support, and without commitment to delivering positive economic reforms, the SPDC is slowly imploding. Pressure is what has made the SPDC react. Pressure, when backed by the power to implement tough economic measures, from the ILO and FAT-F have elicited response. Firm, consistent pressure is what is needed

11. They argue for an increase in aid.

The best aid for Burma is end to military rule. Burma has a very limited absorption capacity for increased aid and is extremely difficult to implement in a way that is transparent, accountable and independent. Extensive research shows that aid is most effective under a democratic government and has little sustainability under poor governance. The rationale behind delivering increased aid is clearly to appease the generals. This unacceptable and inefficient.

12. The authors are dismissive of the ethnic nationalities and local populations.

On the National Convention, they recognize that ethnic participants will be unhappy with the process. Yet, they "view their compliance as assured, as they have no other viable options," thereby suggesting that coercion is acceptable and the ethnic nationalities are a problem to be overcome. Accepting coercion is perverse and unacceptable: the ethnic nationalities make up a substantial portion of the population; preventing their involvement in politics cannot bode well for the future. Without genuine political franchise a cohesive and stable governing structure cannot emerge.

It is curious why the authors have not directed their efforts to convince the SPDC that they have no other "viable option" than genuine democratic reform and reconciliation. Perhaps they have other priorities.

Source of the article: Mazzima