Abkhazia: Putins Remark Sparks Debate on Self-determination Question
Ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians were scheduled to begin talks in Vienna on
25 January but were forced to put them on hold because of the death of Ibrahim
Rugova, the leader of Kosovo's majority Albanian population.
But even before the talks were due to begin, the word was that Britain, France,
the United States, and Russia -- the interested international powers -- had
reached a degree of consensus. The talk is of "conditional independence,"
a formula that would separate Kosovo from Serbia and Montenegro but leave it
subject to an international mission.
Since Moscow regards Serbia as a political ally, this is a diplomatic battle
that Russia appears to have lost. But Putin hinted at his Kremlin press conference
this week that Russia might try to exact a price.
"If someone believes that Kosovo should be granted full independence as
a state, then why should we deny it to the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians? I
am not talking about how Russia will act," Putin said. "However, we
know that Turkey, for instance, has recognized the Republic of Northern Cyprus.
I don't want to say that Russia will immediately recognize Abkhazia or South
Ossetia as independent, sovereign states, but such precedents do exist in international
practice."
Universal Principles
Is that a heavy hint at the future direction of Russian foreign policy or more
a reflection of wounded pride? Perhaps both, but Aleksei Malashenko of the Carnegie
Endowment in Moscow believes that Putin's search for universal principles for
solving frozen conflicts will get Russia nowhere.
"It will give him an opportunity to press on Georgia and to say all the
time that if it was done in Kosovo the same thing can be done in Abkhazia and
maybe in South Ossetia, but at the same time I don't believe in this way Putin
will be successful because the idea of universalism is rejected by the Western
community," Malashenko said.
That's a view shared by Edward Lucas, the Central and Eastern European correspondent
of "The Economist" magazine, who suggests too that Putin may find
that drawing general conclusions about conflict resolution from Kosovo may be
more difficult than he thinks.
"There's two conflicting principles here of self-determination and territorial
integrity. But I think the key thing is that there is no one outside power that
is backing Kosovo," Lucas said. "Kosovo is not the client of a powerful
neighboring state the way that Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniester are.
So I think the first thing we would have to say if one were trying to find a
common standard would be that no neighboring country should exercise a big unilateral
blockade or support for one of these frozen conflicts and that, of course, would
put Russia in a very difficult position."
Self-Determination And Territorial Integrity.
Russia might also find itself treading on very thin ice. The principle of self-determination
in particular cuts both ways. "And there's also Chechnya," Lucas said.
"If you accept that there's the right to self-determination, or at least
that it has to be taken into account, and one doesn't only deal with inviolable
territorial integrity, then it does of course raise the question of Chechnya
now and, perhaps at some other date in the future, some other bits of Russia
that are there more by coincidence that by historical right like, for instance,
Karelia or Tatarstan."
Thin ice or not, there is clearly sympathy in Russia for drawing parallels with
Kosovo. Sergei Markov, director of the Institute of Political Studies, a Moscow
think tank with close ties to the Kremlin, noted on 31 January that while Russia
opposed independence for Kosovo because Serbia is Russia's ally, it would be
prepared to accept it on condition that the precedent is extended to the four
frozen conflicts in the Commonwealth of Independent States.">