Feb 28, 2001

Shan: The Thai-Burma border conflict and Shan resistance


By: Sai Myo Win, General Secretary of the Shan Democratic Union (SDU), an umbrella organization of all Shan exiles.

The recent escalation of the Thai-Burmese armed conflict along the Thai-Shan (Burma) border and the role of Shan resistance received wide media coverage, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. It all started on February 8 when Burmese troops crossed the Thai border in the northern province of Chiangrai, occupied Ban Pang Noon camp in Mae Fah Luang district and captured 19 Thai army personnel. Once the Thai officials managed to escape, the Thai army, who has taken a very strong position on such incursions, retaliated in full force in order to repossess the territory. These clashes left at least six civilians and dozens of Burmese soldiers dead. While perhaps caused by a 'tactical error', or with sheer intention on the part of Burmese army, which in hot pursuit of Shan resistance troops intruded into Thai territory, this event once again reminded the Thai and the international community of the highly volatile and precarious situation along the border.

Since the Burmese military seized state power during a coup in 1962 and subsequently abolished the Union of Burma (Myanmar) Constitution, the spilling-over of Burmese ethnic conflicts into Thai territory has been of frequent occurrence. In so doing, the Burmese terminated the only existing legal bond between them and the Shan and Karenni, their 'brothers-in-arms' against British colonial domination. Now the non-Burmese ethnic groups were to wage a war to free themselves from the yoke of Burmese domination and the brutal suppression of their political, cultural (language) and socio-economic self-determination.

Equally disturbing is the increased importation of illicit drugs, notably methamphetamine (Ya Ba in Thai), by United WA State Army (UWSA). In addition, UWSA is considered a proxy and close ally of the Burmese army. WA finds the latter’s offer to settle in the Shan region too attractive to resist, given the territorial gain envisaged. This serves the Burmese army objective to push out the Shan and thereby undermine the support base of the Shan Army resistance, resulting in large-scale internal displacement of Shan people. The Burmese military, through tactics of divide and rule, ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation, has embarked on a policy of 'Burmanization' and the playing-off of non-Burmese ethnic groups against each other. The recent forced relocation of the Shan carried out by the UWSA (with the collaboration of the Burmese military), within the Shan State Army's (SSA) areas of influence, reflects this deliberate strategy to deprive the Shan resistance of recruitment, food supplies and logistic support. The Thai, in turn, considers this a security threat and a scheme to destroy and disrupt Thai social fabric by flooding the Thai market with heroin and synthetic drugs. Sources within the Thai military privately concede that in a bid to counter methamphetamine and heroin smuggling, covert assistance has been given to the SSA since the latter part of 2000. Initial financial assistance and medicine was soon broadened to include ammunition supply and the tolerance of Shan militia using Thai territory as a springboard for military activity as long as they also attack illicit drugs laboratories.

The important feature of forced population transfer and relocation requires further discussion. This has commonly occurred since the Burmese Army first came to Shan State in 1950 on the pretext of expelling the Chinese Nationalist KMT, who was pushed into Shan State from Yunnan Province of China by Mao Tse Tung's troops. Both the Burmese Army and KMT alike committed all kinds of human rights violations. The situation worsened after the military seized power in 1962 and resistance forces sprang up all over Shan State. In their attempts to crush the opposition forces, one of the strategies of the Burmese Army has been the "Four Cuts" operation, aimed at cutting the food, funds, intelligence and recruits provided by local villagers to the resistance armies. This often involved forcing whole village tracts to move to strategic sites, which could be closely guarded. Throughout the past thirty years, large areas of Shan State have been repeatedly disrupted in this way. However, the current massive forced relocation in Central Shan State since 1996 is unprecedented. Since March 1996, the Burmese military regime has forcibly relocated over 1,400 villages throughout 7,000 square miles in Central Shan State. Over 300,000 people have been ordered to move at gunpoint into strategic relocation sites.

The relocation program was intensified during 1997 and 1998, with new areas being forced to relocate, and existing relocation sites being forced to move again. Vast rural areas of 11 townships have been turned into depopulated "free-fire" zones. During 1997, there was a sharp increase in the number of extra-judicial killings by the regime's troops, with repeated massacres of villagers caught outside the relocation sites. In one township alone, Shan Human Rights foundation (SHRF) has documented the killing of over 300 relocated villagers. The villagers in the relocation sites are used for forced labour by the junta's troops. They must work as porters, build roads, and perform tasks such as digging ditches or building fences at the nearby military camps without food or pay. The encouragement of lawless behaviour against the Shan resulted in numerous cases of physical violence, humiliation and rape.

Generally three main patterns of displacement can be identified. Most Shan people move to the relocation sites, and try to survive by selling off their possessions, working as wage labourers, or even begging. Others remain hiding in the jungle near their villages, dodging army patrols to try and cultivate their old farms. Finally, there are those driven to desperation by the lack of food and security that flee to other parts of Shan State or to Thailand. It is estimated that over a half million Shan have fled into Thailand during the last few years. Current Thai policy has denied these Shan safe refuges and the right to receive humanitarian assistance. Shan refugees have therefore been forced to survive as illegal migrants, seeking shelter and food at construction sites or on farms. Their already precarious situation has been worsened by the Thai economic crisis, which has led to a lack of work and increased arrests and reparations by the Thai authorities. Commenting on the recent population transfer, a Thai academic, Pornpimol Trichote, warned that Burma's move to mobilise troops close to the Thai border is designed to give it the upper hand in any boundary demarcation talks. Relocation of between 200 000 and 300 000 WA close to the border would certainly cause demarcation problems. "We must understand that Burma is a very dynamic military state; that it has, similar to China, very long-term planning". Thailand shares a 2400 km border with Burma, of which only about 59 km are demarcated.

Against this background, the tension along the Thai- Shan border is bound to escalate. The reluctant proxies of Thai and Burmese will be forced by the situation to fight each other, even though it may not be in the interest of both the United WA and the SSA. Sao Yawd Serk, leader of the SSA has thus far refused to condemn the WA intrusion into its areas of operation, stating that the WA is also a 'son' of the Shan State. In the same vein, a WA leader in Pang Sang headquarters bluntly questioned Khin Nyunt, First Secretary of the Burmese military junta, if it was their plan to let the Shan and WA kill each other only to be crushed and dominated by the Burmese once both are exhausted.

It would not be unrealistic to fear a regional and even international escalation of the conflict, involving both regional powers and super powers. Considering the fact that narcotic trafficking respects no borders, the first to be drawn into the conflict are ASEAN members themselves, and Burma's immediate neighbours, China, India and Bangladesh, most of whom have already officially complained about drug trafficking originating in Burma. On the other hand, their involvement may help to bring a quick resolution to the problem and might even initiate other changes in Burma. Thailand, for example, has been advocating forming an alliance with Burma's neighbours China, Bangladesh, India and Laos to pressurise the junta to solve the problems of drugs and ethnic conflicts. However, the Burmese military junta seems determined to crush all armed oppositions militarily, rather than working out a give-and-take political settlement. Speculation aside, the ramification of the Thai-Burmese conflict and the spill over effect of the Shan-Burmese ethnic conflict, could have drastic repercussions. But for the Shan, it is only part and parcel of the Burmese military's grand strategy to subdue the Shan ambition of regaining its birthright sovereignty and the rights of self-determination, in the name of so-called "national unity".

Every aspect of Shan political, cultural and socio-economic life have been systematically monopolized by the Burmese military regime. The prime objective has been to erase any sense of Shan identity, not the least by banning the Shan language from state-run schools and universities. Given the prevailing circumstances, the struggle for freedom and self-determination is expected to continue unabated in the near future. Political stability, peace and reconciliation will only materialise if and when democratically elected parties inclusive of all ethnic peoples in Myanmar are being brought together in a national 'remedy' to benefit this deeply divided society.

References:
1. Border clashes with Burma reveal Thai divisions (Asia Times - February 24, 2001).
2. Fears of growing drug flow through Thailand (The Age - Saturday 24 February 2001).
3. Burmese Border: Junta seeking demarcation edge /Minority offensive seen as a sideshow
(Bangkok Post - February 23, 2001).
4. Dispossessed - A report on forced relocation and extra-judicial killings in Shan State, Burma,
by the Shan Human Rights Foundation, April 1998.
5. Secession As An Ethnic Conflict Resolution: The Case of The Shan States (by Sai Myo Win,
November 1998). (This paper was presented at a conference entitled: 'The Implementation of
the Right to Self-determination as a Contribution to Conflict Prevention', held in Barcelona
from 21 to 27 November 1998, by UNESCO Centre of Catalonia.